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Abstract 
 
Studies of social networks have often taken the existence of a social tie as a proxy for the 
transmission of information. However, other studies of social networks in the labor market 
propose that the likelihood of information transmission might depend on strength of the tie; and 
that tie strength is a potentially important source of the tie’s value. After all, even if job seekers 
have social ties to those who have valuable job information, the seekers will gain little 
information benefit when the ties do not actually transmit the information. This paper clarifies 
the conditions under which social ties might provide information benefits. We use a survey 
vignette experiment and ask MBA students about their likelihood of relaying job information via 
strong ties (to friends) or weak ties (to acquaintances), holding constant the structural locations 
spanned by the tie and job seekers’ fit with the job. The results support the claim that strength of 
tie has a causal effect on the chances of information transmission: potential referrers are more 
likely to relay job information to their friends than to acquaintances. The larger implication of 
these findings is that whatever benefits there might be to using weak ties to reach distant non-
redundant information during job search, these benefits need to be considered against the likely 
fact that people connected via weak ties are less likely to actually share information about job 
opportunities than are people to whom the job seeker is strongly tied. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most influential observations of the contemporary sociology is that 
characteristics associated with a social tie determine when the connected actor receives 
beneficial information. In particular, Granovetter (1973) argued that weak ties provide more 
information benefits than do strong ties, because weak ties tend to reach novel information that 
strong ties do not. Building on this insight, Burt (1992) argued that, even though weakness of ties 
may be correlated with greater information benefits, it is not the weakness of ties per se that 
causally helps an actor achieve information benefits. Rather, it is the tie’s ability to bridge two 
actors without redundant ties (i.e., “spanning range”) that provides actors with information 
benefits. In proposing that tie strength is only an indicator of the tie’s spanning range and not a 
causal driver of the tie’s value, Burt (1992, p.29) emphasized that information benefits are 
determined only by ties’ spanning range and not their strength: “[t]here is no theoretical reason to 
expect a strong correlation between the strength of a relationship and the information benefits it 
provides [after controlling for the spanning range].”1 This premise was adopted by subsequent 
studies with important substantive implications. For instance, research on the “small-world” 
phenomenon (Watts 1999; Watts and Strogatz 1998; Watts, Dodds, and Newman 2002; cf. Aral 
and Van Alstyne 2011; Centola 2010; Centola and Macy 2007) suggested that a few weak 
bridging ties can make a highly clustered network structure almost as efficient as a random 
network structure. If weak bridging ties are as likely to transmit information as are strong ties but 
can reach information unreachable by strong ties, weak bridging ties seem to promise a gain in 
efficiency with no apparent downside. 
                                                            
1 Note that Granovetter (1973) did not argue that tie strength has no effect on motivation, but he argued 
that tie strength is also an indicator of the spanning range. 
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Whereas this line of argument downplayed the causal effect of tie strength on information 
benefits, other studies of social networks in the labor market suggest that insofar as the ties have 
the same spanning range, strong ties might provide more information benefits by being more 
likely to transmit information (Bian 1994, 1997; Granovetter 1983, 1995; Murray, Rankin, and 
Magill 1981; also, see McGuire and Bielby [2015]; Hansen [1999]; Uzzi [1997]). Our general 
intuition also tells us that we are more motivated and thus more likely to help our family and 
friends (i.e., those connected via strong ties) than our acquaintances (i.e., those connected via 
weak ties) by relaying information we have. Accordingly, Obukhova (2012) offers evidence for 
tie strength’s effect on information transmission: she suggests that job seekers get offers through 
strong ties more frequently than through formal means, but that the same is not true for weak 
ties. Marin (2012) provides more direct evidence by asking referrers in the labor market when 
and why they relay job information to someone; and concludes that the factors that drive 
information transmission “should favour information sharing with strong ties over weak ties” 
(Marin 2012, p.188). Insofar as information benefit is a function of a tie’s ability to reach 
valuable information (i.e., spanning range) and the likelihood of actual transmission, Obukhova 
and Marin suggest that tie strength is an important causal driver of the tie’s information benefits 
(albeit not the only causal driver; e.g., Cowan 2014). After all, even if a job seeker has a social 
tie to someone who has valuable job information, the seeker will gain little information benefit 
when the tie does not actually transmit the information. 
Nevertheless, while these studies contribute to our conceptualization of tie strength, their 
observational data provide limited evidence for tie strength’s causal effect. For instance, 
Obukhova’s (2012) evidence is indirect, since she did not observe whether job applicants 
received more information via strong ties relative to weak ties. While Marin (2012) directly 
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observed the process of information transmission, her qualitative method does not allow her to 
control for other structural factors that are correlated with tie strength. As Reagans and McEvily 
(2003, p.241) put it, “because strong ties and social cohesion tend to co-occur, examining tie 
strength by itself creates the potential of observing effects of knowledge transfer that are actually 
due to cohesion.” Insofar as the structural factors such as cohesion are associated with tie 
strength and also make information transmission more likely, we need direct evidence that 
attests to tie strength’s causal effect, independent of other structural correlates.  
Through a unique experimental design, this paper strengthens the basis for the causal 
claim that strong ties are more likely to transmit information than are weak ties. We provide 
MBA students at a university in the northeastern United States with a survey vignette experiment 
and ask about their likelihood of relaying job information to their friends or acquaintances, 
holding constant the structural locations spanned by the tie and job seekers’ fit with the job. The 
results show that referrers are more likely to refer their friends than acquaintances to job 
opportunities. Moreover, this higher motivation to refer their friends holds, even when referrers 
potentially have to risk their reputation by participating in referral activity. Referrers are 
motivated to the extent that they are willing to risk their own reputation loss in order to help their 
friends, but they are not willing to do the same for their acquaintances (cf. Rainwater 1970, p.73; 
Smith 2005, 2007, p.101). Also, referrers still refer their friends at higher rates than they refer 
their acquaintances, even when they can gain a significant amount of monetary bonus by 
referring acquaintances (cf. Beaman and Magruder 2012).  
Consequently, consistent with general intuition and Obukhova and Marin’s interpretation, 
our findings demonstrate that people are more likely to transmit information via strong ties than 
via weak ties. We do not argue that tie strength is the only causal driver of social ties’ value. Nor 
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do we argue that social ties’ value is influenced more by tie strength than the structural range 
spanned by social ties. As Burt argued, ties’ spanning range may still influence social ties’ value 
via enabling them to reach more novel information. But we here provide conceptual 
underpinning and evidence that tie strength also influences ties’ value by making information 
more likely to travel, moderating the effect of ties’ spanning range. In this way, tie strength is not 
just a correlate, but an important determinant of the value of social ties. We conclude by 
discussing potential sources of motivation caused by tie strength and highlighting several 
implications of our results to studies of labor market and social network.  
 
2. Theory  
2.1. Tie Strength as a Correlate, Not a Cause 
 Granovetter’s (1973) Strength-of-Weak-Ties hypothesis was powerful because it 
proposed the counterintuitive structural value of weak ties (for earlier studies of the similar 
argument, see Liu and Duff [1972]; Rogers and Bhowmik [1970]). By discovering that tie 
strength may be a correlate of the tie’s spanning range, he made an important contribution to our 
understanding of weak ties’ value (see Granovetter [1973, p.1063] for the discussion of the 
“forbidden triad”). Yet, Granovetter did not see tie strength only as an indicator of spanning 
range. Rather, he was careful to suggest that tie strength may have a direct causal effect on 
information transmission. Granovetter argued that unsuccessful job seekers may be rescued by 
strong ties in their network, thus attributing some causal effect of tie strength to the chances of 
information transmission. In revisiting the topic ten years later, Granovetter (1983, p.211) 
suggested that those who share strong ties “were more easily called on and willing to help,” even 
though they might be limited in the amount of novel information. Albeit lacking direct evidence 
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for tie strength’s causal effect, Granovetter consequently suggested that tie strength as well as the 
tie’s spanning range might affect social ties’ value. 
By contrast, Burt (1992) had another view. He saw tie strength’s only effect as working 
through the tie’s spanning range: he argued that one of his contributions is to clarify that the 
causal driver of social ties’ value is non-redundancy and not tie strength (1992, p.25-30). 
Ultimately, he concluded that the spanning range is the only causal driver of information 
benefits; and that “there is no reason to expect any causal effect of tie strength” (Burt 1992, 
p.30). Since tie strength does not matter, Burt (1992, p.30) argued that a strategic actor should 
focus on building as many bridging ties as possible, irrespective of their strength (cf. Podolny 
and Baron 1997). Consequently, since tie strength does not causally affect social ties’ value, Burt 
(1992, p.35) proposed to “leap over the motivation issue” by taking the structure as an indicator 
of both opportunity and motivation to help a tie.2 
It is important to clarify the logic behind this premise i.e., why information benefits may 
depend not on tie strength but solely on the spanning range. In particular, note that this premise 
does not dismiss the actual transmission as an important element of information benefits. In fact, 
while Burt did not empirically observe actual transmission of information, he conceptualized 
information transmission as the key way in which social ties provide value: “[T]he probability of 
receiving network benefits from a cluster has two components, the probability that a contact will 
transmit information to you and the probability that it will be transmitted to the contact” (Burt 
1992, p.25). Information benefits would not be realized if the tie that can reach novel and 
valuable information does not actually transmit the information. Tie strength might have no 
                                                            
2 Burt (1992:24-25) acknowledged that “[j]udging friends on the basis of efficiency is an interpersonal 
flatulence from which friends will flee.” In this respect, he hinted that the social ties’ content may be an 
important topic in studying social ties’ value. Nevertheless, his overall argument treats social ties of 
differential strengths as equally likely in transmitting information. 
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effect on information benefits not because the actual information transmission is not important, 
but because tie strength does not seem to be a causal determinant of the likelihood of 
transmission of information: “Information benefits are expected to travel over all bridges, strong 
or weak” (Burt 1992, p.30).  
Eventually, this premise was widely adopted by many studies of social networks to 
conceptualize tie strength only as a correlate of the tie’s structural range. One prominent example 
is the research on the small-world phenomenon (Watts 1999; Watts and Strogatz 1998; Watts et 
al. 2002; cf. Aral and Van Alstyne 2011; Centola 2010; Centola and Macy 2007). This line of 
research suggests that even a minimal number of bridging ties can make the highly clustered 
network structure efficient. One random actor in highly clustered networks cannot efficiently 
transfer his information to another random actor, since the actor cannot easily get to an actor in 
another cluster without bridging ties. Yet, even only a few bridging ties in the highly clustered 
networks can make information travel from one random actor to another random actor quite 
efficiently. Simulating the effect of a few bridging ties on the entire network structure, Watts and 
Strogatz (1998) powerfully illustrated the value of weak bridging ties. And crucial in their model 
is the premise that tie strength does not have any effect on information transmission. By 
suggesting that a weak bridging tie relays information as likely as a strong redundant tie, these 
models drew implications on the value of weak bridging ties.  
 
2.2. Strength Matters: Tie Strength as a Cause 
However, contrary to the widely adopted premise, other studies of social networks in the 
labor market suggest that actors are differentially motivated to send information to their select 
connected contacts. And this argument raises doubts as to whether all social ties are equally 
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likely to transmit information. For instance, Smith (2005) observed that labor market brokers in 
poor black neighborhoods sometimes refrained from referring job seekers because these brokers 
were mindful of the reputation cost associated with referring (also, for studies that point out the 
reputation cost associated with referral, see Bewley [1999, 297]; Fernandez, Castilla, and Moore 
[2000, 1291]; Gërxhani, Brandts, and Schram [2013]; Marin [2012]; Saloner [1985]; Sheppard 
and Belitsky [1966, 187-188]). Prior to Smith (2005), research on social networks attributed 
differences in information benefits from social ties to the “wrong networks” in which 
disadvantaged actors were embedded (Aldrich et al. 1989; Cromie and Birley 1992; Fernandez 
and Fernandez-Mateo 2006; Ruef, Aldrich, and Carter 2003), but Smith (2005) powerfully 
argued that information benefits may vary systematically even within the same networks (also, 
Abraham 2015; Fernandez-Mateo and King 2011; Wilson 1996). 
 Labor market studies further pointed out that information transmission via social ties 
might depend on tie strength specifically. While some scholars have argued that weak ties are 
more helpful for job search success (Granovetter 1973; Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn 1981; Wegener 
1991), other studies suggest that strong ties are associated with better labor market outcomes 
(Bian 1994, 1997; Murray et al. 1981; cf. Montgomery 1992; for a possible resolution between 
the two, see Barbulescu [2015]; Yakubovich [2005]). More recent studies suggest that strong ties 
may be more helpful for getting jobs because family and friends (i.e., contacts who are connected 
through strong ties) are more motivated to help job seekers and relay information about jobs than 
are acquaintances (i.e., contacts who are connected through weak ties; Marsden and Campbell 
2012, p.20; also, see Bian et al. [2015]). These studies provide useful directions in accounting for 
the systematic variation in the benefits of transmission that cannot be accounted for by range. 
However, evidence from these studies cannot rule out that strong ties provide more relevant (thus 
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more valuable) information than do weak ties. Job seekers may get jobs via strong ties more 
frequently because strong ties provide information that better suits job seekers’ qualifications 
(Cingano and Rosolia 2012; Horvath 2014; McDonald 2011). Also, friends may have 
information that homophilious job seekers prefer (Mouw 2003). For instance, Trimble O’Connor 
(2013) finds that those sharing strong ties are more likely to be familiar with one another’s 
qualifications; and that “contacts are better able to help when they are familiar with job seekers’ 
work qualifications than when they are unfamiliar” (p.594). In such cases, those sharing strong 
ties might benefit, even if strong ties were not any more likely to transmit information than were 
weak ties. Consequently, those studies cannot test whether tie strength is a causal mechanism 
behind information transmission via social ties. 
 Obukhova (2012) offers important evidence for this mechanism among job searchers in 
China. By contrast to many prior studies, her unique dataset allows her to observe social ties that 
led to unsuccessful as well as successful job searches, which many prior studies could not 
observe. She observed that job seekers get offers through strong ties more frequently than 
through formal methods. Weak ties were not any more helpful than the formal methods. Based 
on this observation, she argued that friends and family are more motivated than are 
acquaintances to transmit job information to job seekers. Furthermore, she rules out the 
alternative explanation that strong ties connect job seekers to more relevant (thus valuable) job 
information. She observed that job seekers do not prefer the offers that they get via strong ties 
relative to offers obtained through weak ties. With this evidence, she argued that the value of 
strong ties relative to weak ties likely comes from their being more likely to transmit 
information, and not higher relevance of the information. However, Obukhova did not directly 
observe information transmission. Thus, while Obukhova’s evidence is consistent with tie 
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strength’s effect on information transmission, her indirect observation does not allow us to 
confirm tie strength’s causal effect (also, for another study that investigates the causal effect of 
strong ties for hiring but does not directly observe information transmission, see Godechot 
[2016]). 
 Marin (2012) offers rich qualitative evidence that addresses this issue. By directly 
observing referral behaviors of insurance agents, she reported that only 27% of her informants 
referred someone to the job opportunity that they came across. By reporting the strikingly high 
selectivity, Marin argued that it is important to learn what drives the motivation to relay the job 
opportunity. Marin identified four distinct factors her informants considered before transmitting 
information i.e., desire to help the contacts, concerns for reputations, reluctance to appear 
intrusive, and fears of awkwardness. Marin argued that these four factors shaped her informants’ 
motivation to transmit information, generally favoring family and friends over acquaintances as 
targets of referral. Her direct observation bolsters confidence that tie strength has an effect on 
transmission of information. However, her qualitative evidence leaves unclear whether tie 
strength in itself has a causal effect on information transmission, or whether tie strength is only 
spuriously correlated with other structural factors that actually drive transmission. Other research 
suggests that the latter might be the case. In particular, Reagans and McEvily (2003) suggest that 
those connected via a strong tie might be able to share knowledge with one another more easily 
not because their strong tie causes easier information transmission, but because those connected 
via a strong tie are also more likely to have similar contacts and thus encounter familiar 
information repeatedly (cf., Hansen 1999). When controlling for such structural correlates (e.g., 
shared contacts), Reagans and McEvily (2003, p.240) find that tie strength has little to no effect. 
Consequently, Marin’s (2012) evidence – albeit direct – does not sufficiently test tie strength’s 
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independent causal effect.  We need direct evidence that attests to tie strength’s causal effect on 
motivation to transmit information, independent of other structural factors such as cohesion.  
 
3. Empirical Setting 
Our overall objective is to test whether tie strength causally affects the likelihood of 
information transmission. Toward this goal, we designed a vignette experiment wherein potential 
referrers can refer their friends or their acquaintances to a hypothetical job opportunity. While 
qualitative observational studies (e.g., Marin 2012; Smith 2005; Uzzi 1997) identify strong ties 
among actors, those studies cannot separate out effects of other variables that are often correlated 
with tie strength (Mouw 2003, 2006; Reagans 2005; Reagans and McEvily 2003). In a vignette 
study, experimental procedures can be used to control factors that are often correlated with tie 
strength in order to isolate its causal effect. Parsing out the effect of tie strength from other 
structural factors is especially important in our study, since we are trying to build on Marin 
(2012) and Reagans and McEvily (2003) and empirically test whether tie strength has an 
independent causal effect on information transmission. Also, experimental procedures also allow 
us to control for (often unobservable) social similarity, and we can directly test whether tie 
strength drives more likely information transmission independently of other factors that also 
drive information transmission. By doing so, we can build on previous studies and empirically 
test what is driving more likely information transmission among those who share socially similar 
characteristics (cf., McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). Our vignette experiment further 
holds constant potential referrers’ opportunity to refer (Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo 2006), 
the amount of potential referrers’ knowledge about job seekers (Aral and Van Alstyne 2011; 
Marin 2012; Trimble O’Connor 2013), potential referrers’ knowledge about job seekers’ 
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qualifications (Marin 2012; Smith 2005), and job seekers’ search status (McDonald and Elder 
2006).3 Because tie strength is the only variable affecting potential referrers’ likelihood to refer 
job information, we can isolate the causal effect of tie strength on the motivation to refer. 
Our vignette setting concerns referral activities concerning job openings in the labor 
market. The labor market serves as an attractive vignette setting for our empirical test because 
referral activities embody a familiar information transmission process wherein potential referrers 
decide whether or not to transmit the job information to their contacts. Prior studies also suggest 
that it may be costly for referrers to refer their contacts: when referrers decide to relay job 
information to their contacts, they consider how they would appear to the employer and try to 
manage their reputation (Marin 2012; Smith 2005). That is, once potential referrers transmit the 
information to their contacts, their reputation as judges of quality candidates is on the line. If tie 
strength is a meaningful causal driver of social ties’ access benefit, tie strength should have an 
effect on information transmission even when it is costly (cf. Rainwater 1970; Smith 2005, 2007, 
p.101). Our vignette takes advantage of this feature by testing whether referrers transmit 
information even when they need to risk their reputation by vouching for their contacts.4  
Moreover, practically, referring is an important part of the hiring process (Fernandez and 
Weinberg 1997; Fernandez et al. 2000). In the 1991 General Social Survey, when respondents 
were asked “Please tell me all the ways that you found out about this job,” the most common 
                                                            
3 Extant literature suggests that the likelihood of information transmission might vary depending on these 
factors that our vignette holds constant. The main focus of our vignette is to test the main effect of tie 
strength on the likelihood of information transmission, holding constant those factors while only varying 
tie strength. To the degree that other factors render the effect of tie strength spurious, holding these 
factors constant it should make it more difficult to find the effect of tie strength. 
4 There might be other costs associated with transmitting information via social ties, besides reputation, 
e.g., time it takes to relay the information. We use the reputation cost as one example of such cost, since it 
seems very salient in the referral process, based on prior research. We thank a reviewer for helping us 
clarify this point. 
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response (37%) was “From someone who already worked there.” The prevalence of referring in 
the hiring process suggests that the instances where information can potentially be relayed via 
social ties are a general context for studying tie strength’s effect on information transmission. 
 
3.1. Procedures 
We distributed an anonymous vignette survey to first-year MBA students at a university 
in the northeastern United States. They took the survey during an orientation session on 
“Networks and Job Search,” and were given ten minutes to take the survey.5 MBA students are 
suitable for our vignettes, since they are both knowledgeable about the referral process and 
sensitive to the reputation cost associated with job referrals,6 as confirmed by their responses 
(more below; also, see Greenberg and Fernandez 2016 and Appendix). In their responses to 
questions about background, more than half of our sample (50.3%) reported that they had applied 
to a job that they learned about through social ties. Also, more than half (59.7%) reported that 
they had solicited someone to be their employee referral to a job opening at their company. 
These numbers likely suggest that an even higher percentage of our sample is experienced in the 
referral process, since our participants may have chosen not to apply to jobs to which they had 
been referred. Similarly, they may have decided not to refer anyone even when they knew of 
opportunities and qualified candidates. As discussed above, Marin (2012) reported that her 
informants referred someone to a job only 27% of the time when they had the opportunity to do 
                                                            
5 The session happened in September 2010 with first-year MBA students; all our participants were new to 
campus. Students took the survey in the beginning of the session, right after the instructor introduced 
himself to the class. While everyone at the session took the survey, four participants’ responses were 
illegible, so they were excluded from the analysis. 
6 Most MBAs in our sample are relatively young (average age is around 28) and early in their career 
(average years of experience is around 5), both of which might make them more vulnerable to reputation 
risks than those who are more established in their career. 
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so. These responses help us build confidence that a vignette about referral can properly test the 
effect of tie strength on information transmission for our sample, without making the 
hypothetical nature of the vignette too salient. In the discussion section below, we further 
elaborate on ramifications of using this sample and design. 
There are two possible designs for the vignette that serve our purpose. A first possible 
vignette might ask participants to choose among relaying information to friends (i.e., those 
connected via strong ties), relaying information to acquaintances (i.e., those connected via weak 
ties), and withholding their information; and we can test to which party participants are more 
likely to transmit information (or when they decide not to withhold the information). However, 
this design conflates why participants are motivated one way or another: do participants relay 
information to friends because they want to help their friends, or is it because they do not want to 
help their acquaintances? Therefore, we opted for an alternative design where one group of 
participants is given a choice between relaying their information to their friends and withholding 
the information. The other group of participants is given a choice between relaying their 
information to their acquaintances and withholding (more details on the design below). By 
comparing the likelihood of transmission in this between-person design, we can more directly 
test how likely participants are to relay information via their strong ties versus how likely they 
are to relay information via their weak ties. 
After receiving the survey in the beginning of their orientation session, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of four conditions using a paper and pencil survey instrument, in a 
two-by-two between-person design. Along one factor, we manipulated strength of tie. Following 
Marsden and Campbell’s (1984) findings that “closeness” is the best indicator of tie strength, we 
operationalized strong ties as friends and weak ties as acquaintances. This was our main 
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manipulation for the overall objective of our empirical test. Along the second factor, we 
manipulated whether or not the referrer’s firm pays a referral bonus. As suggested by Beaman 
and Magruder (2012) in their field experiment, cash bonuses likely affect actors’ referring 
behavior. Participants in one set of conditions were not told anything about a bonus; participants 
in the other set of conditions were told that their firm was offering $1,000 for referring a 
successful hire. This second manipulation would allow us to test whether tie strength’s effect can 
be bought with economic incentives. This manipulation also puts the vignette in the real-world 
setting, where cash bonuses are often paid for successful referrals (more below; Fernandez and 
Weinberg 1997; Fernandez et al. 2000). Table 1 reports the number of participants for the four 
cells of the design. 
Table 1 – Distribution of participants into each conditionª 
 
 Friend Acquaintance Total 
No bonus 55 46 101 
$1,000 48 47 95 
Total 103 93 196 
ª200 participants received the survey, but responses from four participants were illegible or left 
blank. Therefore, we excluded them from the analysis. 
 
Participants in all conditions read the following scenario, on the first page of the survey: 
You are working at an IT firm. You often spend time on-line posting to list-serves and in 
large internet chat-rooms discussing technical questions related to your work. Recently, 
you have received several emails from the HR department encouraging employees to 
refer software developers.  
To this description, the following phrase was added for the two bonus scenarios: “[HR 
Department is] offering a bonus of $1,000 to employees who refer successful candidates who 
stay with the firm for at least a 90 day probation period.” The context of “IT firm” was chosen in 
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order to provide generic description of a company that is a familiar and plausible employer for 
our participants without raising concerns on some context-specific characteristics of other 
industries (e.g., family businesses). 
For the strong tie conditions, participants were told on the second page that “You become 
aware that Robert, who also participates in the list-serve, is looking to change jobs. Robert is a 
close friend. Robert’s credentials and experience might make him a good fit for the job at your 
firm.” Participants in the weak tie conditions were told on the second page that “You become 
aware that Ben, who also participates in the list-serve, is looking to change jobs. Ben is not 
someone you know personally. Ben’s credentials and experience might make him a good fit for 
the job at your firm.”7 This design is grounded in previous studies, where there is precedent for 
thinking of friends as strong ties (e.g., Granovetter 1973; Marsden and Campbell 1984, 2012). 
Similarly, there is precedent for thinking of industry contacts (e.g., Ruef et al. 2003) or members 
of the same cooperatives (e.g., Abraham 2015) as weak ties, since they represent those who have 
interacted with one another before but do not know each other closely. The vignette controls for 
structural factors such as cohesion by implying the same structural location (i.e., being in the 
same list-serve) but manipulates only strength of ties.   
Finally, we intentionally left the job seeker’s qualification ambiguous and constant across 
conditions, so that participants face similar levels of uncertainty as to how qualified the job 
seeker is. Controlling for perceived qualifications of contacts is especially important, since those 
sharing a strong tie might be more familiar with one another’s qualifications (cf., Trimble 
O’Connor 2013). Also, it is worth noting that there is no a priori reason to think that participants 
                                                            
7 We did not vary the gender of the potential target of referral, since we were primarily interested in 
testing tie strength’s effect on information transmission in general. The gender of participants (i.e., 
potential referrers) does not affect the results. Some prior and ongoing studies investigate how the gender 
of the target affects the likelihood to refer (cf., Abraham 2015; Fernandez-Mateo and King 2011).  
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in our sample are more likely to think that their friends are more qualified than acquaintances in 
the given vignette. We tell participants that both friends and acquaintances have “credentials and 
experience [that] might make him a good fit for the job at your firm,” and both friends and 
acquaintances seem to be from the same background. The balance of qualification between 
friends and acquaintances then suggests that participants in all conditions face the same 
reputation risk when referring the job seeker – i.e., if participants choose to relay the information 
to their contacts, their reputation as a “good referrer” is equally at risk in all conditions. 
Afterwards, the questions for the likelihood of referring were then asked (described in detail 
below). The survey concluded with a few questions about participants’ background and 
experience with referring. See Appendix Table 1 and Appendix Table 2 for the further 
description on participants’ background and randomization check.8 
We measured the likelihood of referring by asking participants in all conditions: “How 
likely are you to do each of the following?” The first statement was “Contact [Robert or Ben] 
and encourage him to apply for the job as your referral.” Participants were asked to rate their 
likelihood of referring from 1 to 9, from “Not Very Likely” to “Very Likely.” To make sure that 
participants know the monetary benefit of referring for the bonus conditions, the following 
phrase was added “(in which case, you would be eligible to receive the referral bonus of 
$1,000)” to this item in bonus conditions. 
As discussed above, studies suggest that reputation risks may be an important factor 
affecting people’s willingness to transmit job information in the labor market. Therefore, we also 
asked participants how likely they are to “Contact [Robert or Ben] and encourage him to apply 
                                                            
8 None of the non-randomized individual-specific variables, including gender, age, work experience, and 
international experience, affect the results (in main effect or interaction effect), so we do not discuss them 
further. 
17 
 
for the job, but NOT using your name.” To make sure that participants know what it means to 
refer without using their names, for the bonus conditions the phrase “(in which case, you would 
NOT be eligible to receive the referral bonus of $1,000)” was added to this item.  
Lastly, it is worth clarifying what the bonus in this experimental setup means to our 
participants and what its theoretical implications might be. As paying a bonus for a successful 
referral is a common practice in US industries, our participants are likely to be familiar with 
monetary incentives for (successful) referrals and can easily envision playing the role of 
potential referrer in our hypothetical scenario. Theoretically, the bonus represents one of a few 
motivators (yet an important one) for one’s propensity to transmit information via social ties. 
There are of course other plausible motivators for one’s propensity to refer, such as social 
rewards for one’s prosocial activities (Simpson and Willer 2015). Since the monetary bonus is a 
common motivator for referral in the labor market, it is included in our experimental setup, in 
addition to tie strength (which is the focus of our question). Finally, it is worth noting that the 
bonus amount ($1000) is a plausible amount of bonus awarded for a successful referral among 
our participants. If anything, it might represent a lower bound: MBAs from the same program of 
our participants reported in the same year that they have received as much as $30,000 for a 
successful referral. The mean bonus amount our participants report for a successful referral is 
$2153 (see Appendix for more).  
 
3.2. Dependent Variables 
There are two dependent variables of interest. The first is the response to the first 
question (How likely are you to…Contact [friend or acquaintance] and encourage him to apply 
for the job?). This measures participants’ willingness to transmit information about the 
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hypothetical job opening, as well as their willingness to incur any associated reputation costs. 
This dependent variable allows us to test whether strong ties are more likely to transmit 
information than are weak ties. 
The second dependent variable is the difference between the response to the first question 
(i.e., propensity to refer) and the response to the second question (i.e., propensity to refer without 
reputation risk). Recall that the second question asks participants how likely they are to refer 
without their names attached, and that the only difference between the first and the second 
questions is how likely one is to attach one’s name to the referral activity. Therefore, this second 
dependent variable (i.e., the difference between the response to the first question and the 
response to the second question) measures participants’ propensity or willingness to risk their 
reputation, or “stick their necks out” for their job seeking contacts. Note that conceptually, the 
value of this measure can be negative as well as positive: the negative value indicates that 
participants want to protect their reputation rather than risking it. Alternatively, the positive 
value means that they are willing to risk their reputation by referring. Thus, a bigger positive 
value of this measure suggests that participants are more willing to risk their reputation for their 
job seeking contacts. This dependent variable allows us to test tie strength’s even when referrers 
have taken into consideration reputation costs. 
 
4. Analyses 
4.1. Tie strength’s effect on information transmission 
We first directly test whether referrers’ willingness to transmit information about a job 
opening (i.e., refer) depends on tie strength. In order to do so, we test whether they refer their 
friends with greater likelihood than their acquaintances, pooling data across the two bonus 
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conditions. The results show that participants were more likely to refer their friends (mean=7.99; 
n=103) than their acquaintances (mean=5.70; n=93; t-statistic=8.50; p-value<0.001).9 This 
finding is consistent within the two bonus conditions as well. When not offered any referral 
bonus, participants were much more likely to refer their friends (mean=8.09; n=55) than their 
acquaintances (mean=4.91; n=46; t-statistic=9.05; p-value<0.001). This was also true, even when 
participants were offered a bonus: participants were more likely to refer friends (mean=7.88; 
n=48) than acquaintances (mean=6.47; n=47; t-statistic=3.64; p-value<0.001). Table 2 
summarizes these findings. 
Extant literature suggests that a monetary bonus can make social ties more likely to 
transmit information (Beaman and Magruder 2012). In other words, strong ties might be more 
likely to transmit information than weak ties, but the effect of tie strength can be overridden by 
encouraging weakly tied actors with a monetary bonus (see e.g., Fernandez et al. [2000, 1333] 
discussion of people “referring their dogs” for a bonus). Therefore, we test whether social ties 
are more likely to transmit information when contacts are paid for transmitting information to 
their acquaintances. The results show that unpaid participants are still more likely to refer their 
friends (mean=8.09; n=55) than are paid participants to refer their acquaintances (mean=6.47; 
n=47; t-statistic=5.03; p-value<0.001). Interestingly, participants were not more likely to refer 
their friends when they were paid the bonus than when they were not paid the bonus (t-
statistic=0.80; p-value=0.43). Rather, if anything, participants were more motivated to refer their 
friends without a bonus (mean=8.09; n=55) than with a bonus (mean=7.88; n=48). One way to 
interpret this result is that the benefits endowed by strong ties is barely affected by a bonus, at 
                                                            
9 While t-test is efficient, it also assumes equal variance between two populations. Violation of this 
assumption may decrease the validity of the test especially when the sample sizes are unequal. Therefore, 
we also use Mann-Whitney U test as well, and all results are substantively the same (Fay and Proschan 
2010; Mann and Whitney 1947). 
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least within the bounds of our empirical design.10 By contrast, participants showed a higher 
willingness to refer their acquaintances when they were paid (t-statistic: 3.49; p-value<0.001). 
Regression analysis reported in Appendix Table 4 further confirms that the bonus successfully 
encouraged our participants to be more likely to transmit information when they were doing so 
via weak ties, but the bonus did not make a difference when they were transmitting information 
via strong ties. 
Table 2 – Response to the first question (i.e., mean propensity to refer with name attached) 
where participants were asked how likely they were to refer their friends or acquaintances for the 
hypothetical job opportunity. The possible value ranges from 1 to 9, from “Not very likely” to 
“Very likely,” respectively. Standard deviation is reported in the parentheses. 
 
 
 Friend Acquaintance Differenceª 
No bonus 
 
8.09 
(0.89) 
[N=55] 
 
4.91 
(2.24) 
[N=46] 
*** 
$1,000 
 
7.88 
(1.70) 
[N=48] 
 
6.47 
(2.05) 
[N=47] 
*** 
Differenceª NS ***  
 
ªP-value from the t-test on difference between the two values. The bottom row denotes p-value 
between “No bonus” and “$1000” conditions in each respective tie strength condition. The right-
most column denotes p-value from the t-test on difference between “Friend” and “Acquaintance” 
conditions in each respective bonus condition. **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; NS means p>0.05 
 
 
                                                            
10 We are cautious not to overclaim implications of this finding, however, since participants’ likelihood to 
refer their friends was close to the maximum possible value (9).  
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4.2. Willingness to Risk Reputation 
The previous analysis shows that participants are more likely to pass along job 
information to their friends than to their acquaintances. However, as discussed above, extant 
literature raises the issue of how reputation risk might also affect people’s propensity to refer 
(Rainwater 1970; Smith 2005, 2007, p.101). Insofar as the monetary incentive represents the 
benefit of referring, the reputation risk represents the potential cost that referrers have to incur 
when transmitting information via social ties. In other words, even though participants were 
more willing to refer their friends, they may not be more willing to risk reputation for their 
friends than their acquaintances. Yet, because the candidate’s qualifications were held constant 
across conditions, the previous analyses did not vary the potential reputation cost associated with 
referring the candidate. Here, we directly test whether friends are more likely to pass along job 
information, despite the possible reputation risk associated with referral activity. Recall that the 
measure represents participants’ propensity to “stick their necks out” for their job seeking 
contacts, so that the positive value of the measure represents the extent to which they are willing 
to risk their reputation for their contacts; and the negative value represents the extent to which 
they want to refrain from risking their reputation. Table 3 presents this measure, and Appendix 
Table 3 shows raw responses to the second question. 
 We first assess the internal validity of the reputation risk. Participants were anonymous in 
our empirical design; therefore, it is possible that participants did not care about their reputation 
in our setting. However, other studies suggest that participants manage their reputation even in 
anonymous experimental settings (e.g., Hahl et al. 2015; Yamagishi and Mifune 2008; cf. 
Salganik, Dodds, and Watts 2006). Indeed, our results show that participants cared about their 
reputations, at least to the extent that they were willing to put economic value on their 
22 
 
reputations. Using the difference between the response to the first question and the response to 
the second, we show that participants were more willing to stick their necks out when they were 
paid (mean=3.58; n=95) than when they were not paid (mean=2.12; n=101; t-statistic=2.80; p-
value<0.01).  
 We now directly test whether the effect of tie strength holds even when actors care about 
their reputation. Accordingly, we find that participants were in general more willing to risk their 
reputation by referring their friends (mean=4.43; n=103) than to risk their reputation by referring 
their acquaintances (mean=1.05; n=93; t-statistic=7.00; p<0.001). This main result demonstrates 
the effect of tie strength, despite the potential reputation risk for the referrer. We further find that 
unpaid participants were more willing to risk their reputation by referring their friends 
(mean=4.38; n=55) than to risk their reputation by referring their acquaintances (mean=-0.59; 
n=46; t-statistic=8.08; p-value<0.001). Although the value is not significantly different from 
zero, it is worth noting that unpaid participants were more willing to protect their reputation than 
they were to risk it for their acquaintances, represented by the negative absolute value. By 
contrast, the positive absolute value for the unpaid participants with opportunities to refer their 
friends suggests that unpaid participants were willing to risk their reputation for their friends. 
Even when paid, participants were more willing to risk their reputation for their friends 
(mean=4.48; n=48) than to risk their reputation for their acquaintances (mean=2.66; n=47; t-
statistic=2.70; p-value<0.01).11 Table 3 summarizes these findings. Additional analyses show 
that unpaid participants were more willing to risk their reputation for their friends (mean=4.38; 
                                                            
11 As in the first set of analysis, when our participants were deciding whether or not to risk their 
reputation by referring their acquaintances, a bonus made a difference and effectively encouraged them to 
risk their reputation (t-statistic: 4.75; p-value<0.001). Analyses presented in Appendix Table 5 also 
confirm these results. 
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n=55) than paid participants were for their acquaintances (mean=2.66; n=47; t-statistic=2.83; p-
value<0.01).  
In sum, these results demonstrate the robust effect of tie strength on the motivation to 
relay information. Even when people face risks to their reputation, they are more likely to 
transmit information to friends than acquaintances. Moreover, the boost in the motivation to refer 
associated with strong ties is robust to a hefty sum of monetary incentives, at least within the 
bounds of our empirical design. The fact that tie strength’s effect works with both positive 
incentive (e.g., monetary bonus) and negative incentive (e.g., reputation risks) demonstrates that 
tie strength in itself is an important determinant of the value of social ties. 
 
Table 3 – Participants’ willingness to risk her reputation for her contact. The measure comes 
from the difference between the response to the first question (i.e., propensity to refer) and the 
response to the second question (i.e., propensity to refer without name attached). Substantively, 
the measure represents participants’ propensity or willingness to risk their reputation. The 
negative value means that participants want to protect one’s reputation; the positive value means 
that they are willing to risk their reputation by referring. Standard deviation is reported in the 
parentheses. 
 
 
 Friend Acquaintance Differenceª 
No bonus 
 
4.38 
(2.79) 
[N=55] 
 
-0.59 
(3.30) 
[N=46] 
*** 
$1,000 
 
4.48 
(3.27) 
[N=48] 
 
2.66 
(3.29) 
[N=47] 
** 
Difference NS ***  
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ªP-value from the t-test on difference between the two values. The bottom row denotes p-value 
between “No bonus” and “$1000” conditions in each respective tie strength condition. The right-
most column denotes p-value from the t-test on difference between “Friend” and “Acquaintance” 
conditions in each respective bonus condition. **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; NS means p>0.05 
 
4.3. External and Internal Validity of Our Vignette Design12 
Like any other vignette experiments, our design is limited in that it presents a 
hypothetical situation, and that the responses do not necessarily materialize into actual behaviors. 
But as mentioned above, our vignette purposefully represents a plausible and familiar scenario 
for our participants, potentially making results more generalizable. Moreover, our setting might 
serve as a conservative research design for studying tie strength’s causal effect on information 
transmission. If anything, insofar as our vignette presents a hypothetical situation to participants, 
it would be surprising that our participants refer their friends and acquaintances with differential 
likelihood: why not say that they would refer everyone and appear friendlier, when there is no 
cost of answering that way? Insofar as we are focusing on the difference between the likelihood 
to transmit information via strong ties and the likelihood via weak ties, and insofar as 
participants in all conditions faced equally hypothetical opportunities to transmit information, 
any differential likelihood to transmit information would provide a stronger footing for the 
causal effect of tie strength.  
Lastly, note that our experimental setup relies on a subtle verbal manipulation of tie 
strength. Insofar as tie strength is most likely to depend on the cluster of characteristics and 
emotions, any effect that comes from the simple verbal manipulation would be surprising. While 
any vignette studies contain a risk of producing a demand effect, the subtlety of cues on 
differential tie strength likely ameliorates such concern. Finally, even if such cues come across 
                                                            
12 We thank a reviewer for helping us clarify this point. 
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less subtle than anticipated to our participants, participants in all conditions were exposed to the 
cues of the similar salience: therefore, the differential likelihood of tie strength’s effect is likely 
not the outcome of a demand effect. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 Much of the contemporary research on social networks has overlooked the causal effect 
of tie strength on access to information. Burt’s (1992) premise travelled far in some studies of 
social networks, as the research on the small-world phenomenon adopted the premise and 
suggested important implications of weak ties. Yet, direct evidence on tie strength’s causal effect 
(or a lack thereof) was non-existent. To this, our experimental design allows us to bolster claims 
of a causal effect of tie strength on the chances of transmitting information about a job vacancy. 
Moreover, insofar the value associated with strong ties might come from greater relevance, 
greater knowledge, more numerous opportunities, and homophilious association, as suggested by 
some previous studies, our experiment provides the most direct test where all those factors are 
controlled. Our findings then imply that in addition to structural range, the likelihood of 
information transmission needs to be considered as an important determinant of social ties’ 
value.13 Consequently, our contribution is two-fold: theoretical in providing a clearer conceptual 
underpinning to conditions under which social ties might provide information benefits; and 
empirical in strengthening the causal claim about tie strength. 
 
                                                            
13 We are not in any way suggesting that actors more likely get their friends hired. Our question here 
concerns whether strong ties are more likely to transmit information. Yet, to the degree that employers 
give some weight to having been referred in their screening decisions (Fernandez and Galperin 2014; 
Granovetter 1979), it might well be that such a preference for strong ties do indeed affect hiring 
outcomes. 
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5.1. Why Are Strong Ties More Likely to Transmit Information? 
 While our empirical test does not identify a specific source of higher motivation 
associated with strong ties, there are a few different possible sources of the motivation (see 
Marin [2012, p.188-189] for further discussion). One of the possible sources is actors’ concern 
for the “shadow of the future.” Axelrod (1984) suggests that cooperation may emerge when the 
chances of continued interaction are great enough, because actors who are likely to interact with 
one another in the future expect to be reciprocated. More recent research empirically tests 
emergence of cooperation between two actors expecting to interact in the future (see Simpson 
and Willer [2015] for review). Then, insofar as actors expect to interact with their friends and 
family in the future more so than do they with their acquaintances, they might be instrumentally 
more motivated to help their friends and family.  
 Another possible source of higher motivation associated with strong ties is one’s affinity 
to one’s friends and family (e.g., Granovetter 1973, 1983): actors simply like their friends and 
family more than their acquaintances, so they relay job information via strong ties more 
frequently than via weak ties. They may also think it almost a duty to help their friends and 
family, out of a sense of obligation. Becker (1976) provides a variant of this argument, where an 
increase in one’s friends and family’s (e.g., child’s) utility elevates one’s (e.g., parent’s) own 
utility not because one expects to be reciprocated in the future, but solely because one enjoys 
knowing that one’s friends and family experienced an increase in utility. These arguments 
suggest that strong ties might be more likely to transmit information than weak ties even without 
the possibility of future reciprocation. We cannot adjudicate between these motivations in the 
current study. Based on our causal evidence we have offered here that tie strength is a causal 
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driver of information transmission, future work should investigate the extent to which the 
“shadow of the future” governs this effect and what other sources of motivation there might be.  
 
5.2. Implications to the Research on the Small-World Phenomenon and the Labor Market 
Implications of our findings are especially far-reaching to the research that assumed that 
tie strength does not affect access to information. As introduced earlier, Watts and Strogatz 
(1998) argued that even a minimal number of weak bridging ties can make the highly clustered 
network structure highly efficient. However, such a conclusion was possible because they 
assumed that information always travels through any social ties without regard to why the sender 
is motivated to pass along the information. Several studies do suggest that the “free” information 
transmission is quite common (e.g., Fleming, King, and Juda 2007; Uzzi and Spiro 2005), but 
such an assumption may not hold in other contexts where the sender of information cares about 
the cost of transmitting the information; and violation of the assumption may reduce the value of 
weak bridging ties. In fact, Reagans and Zuckerman (2008, p.5) adopt Watts and Strogatz’s 
simulation model and adjust the parameter about the likelihood of information flow (so that 
strong redundant ties transmit information more likely than weak bridging ties). When weak ties 
do not transmit information as much as strong ties do, Reagans and Zuckerman find that a few 
weak bridging ties do not make the network structure as efficient as Watts and Strogatz 
suggested.14 In our study, we do not directly test how the causal effect of tie strength leads to 
social ties’ value in the whole network structure. However, those simulation studies imply that 
the differential likelihood of information transmission might be an important determinant of 
                                                            
14 Similarly, Boorman (1975) parameterizes his simulation model so that strong ties are more likely to 
transmit information. When also assuming that strong ties require more resources to maintain, Boorman’s 
simulation model suggests that having strong ties is more preferable than weak ties if actors need surer 
access to job information. 
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social ties’ value to the whole network structure, and our results provide empirical validation to 
such parameter choices used in the simulation studies – i.e., lower likelihood of information 
transmission via weak ties than that via strong ties.  
 We also highlight a tension in employer-referrer-job seeker triadic relationships in the 
labor market (Rubineau and Fernandez 2015; Bidwell and Fernandez-Mateo 2008). It is now 
well known that referrers play an important role in facilitating the match between employers and 
job seekers. However, prior research on labor market has often overlooked referrers’ motivation 
to transmit information in the employer-referrer-job seeker triadic relationships. We show that 
strong ties provide one logic through which referrers decide to pass along information. 
Moreover, even though employers often try to encourage referrals to qualified candidates 
through the use of referral bonuses (Fernandez and Weinberg 1997; Fernandez et al. 2000), we 
show that strong ties are relatively immune to such a mechanism. As a result, referrers are put in 
role conflict between employers and job seekers, both of whom referrers might feel obligated to 
serve. While role conflict of brokers has long been documented in the brokerage literature 
(Fernandez and Gould 1994; Friedman and Podolny 1992; Gould and Fernandez 1989; Podolny 
and Baron 1997; Xiao and Tsui 2007; see Fernandez and Castilla [2001, p.90] for possible role 
conflict in the labor market context), literature on labor market intermediaries has tended to 
examine positive aspects of referral activity for the demand-side (Fernandez and Weinberg 1997; 
Fernandez et al. 2000; Marsden and Gorman 2001) and the supply-side (Bidwell and Fernandez-
Mateo 2008, p.160-172; Granovetter 1995; Fernandez and Galperin 2014; Greenberg and 
Fernandez 2016; Obukhova and Lan 2013; Rubineau and Fernandez 2015; Yakubovich 2005). 
Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo (2006; also, Fernandez and Sosa [2005]; Rubineau and 
Fernandez [2013]) hinted that referrers tend to serve their friends irrespective of employers’ 
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concerns, but they did not observe the tension directly from the perspective of referrers. Future 
research should address how job market actors try to resolve such role conflict (cf. Beaman and 
Magruder 2012, p.3587-3588; Fernandez-Mateo 2007), as referrers may behave differently 
depending on for whom they want to manage their long-term reputation (e.g., Fernandez and 
Bond 2015).  
 On this point, it is worth putting our results in comparison to Smith’s (2005, p.37), since 
she found that concern for friends and family is “secondary” to the concern for one’s reputation 
risk in her context. By contrast, our findings show that participants are more likely to refer their 
friends irrespective of reputation cost. While we do not directly address why our findings show 
otherwise, one possible explanation is that it is just a matter of degree: strong ties are still more 
likely to transmit information than are weak ties, but sometimes concerns for reputation risks 
trump motivations propelled by strong ties. And such difference in degree may come from the 
fact that our study examines a very different sample (i.e., MBAs, who are who may be less 
threatened by the reputation risk and more used to having qualified friends and acquaintances) 
than Smith’s sample of largely minority low wage and economically vulnerable workers. Future 
studies will therefore examine how higher motivation associated with strong ties changes 
depending on actors’ perception of reputation risk associated with referral activity. 
 
5.3. Possible Limits of Strong Ties 
 Lastly, we are cautious not to overclaim strong ties’ value. Recall that while participants 
expressed a higher willingness to transmit the job information via strong ties, they were more 
likely to transmit via weak ties when they could ask their contacts not to put their reputation on 
the line (see Appendix Table 3 “no bonus” conditions). It might be awkward and perhaps even 
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insulting to ask one’s contact not to use one’s name, because it might convey the impression that 
one does not think highly of one’s contact’s ability to perform well on the job; in such a case, 
weak ties might be more likely to transmit the job information. Nevertheless, insofar as applying 
to a job as a referral might be more helpful than applying to a job as a non-referral, strong ties 
are still more helpful for beneficial information transmission, i.e., information benefits 
(Fernandez and Weinberg 1997; Fernandez et al. 2000; Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo 2006). 
Yet, these results suggest that, when the situation mandates one to transmit information under the 
condition that our second vignette question provides (i.e., transmitting information without 
allowing the contact to reveal the source of information), one might be more freely transmit 
information via weak ties (cf., Simmel 1950). 
 Ultimately, implications of our study provide scholars of social networks promising 
avenue for future research. The higher motivation associated with strong ties may have 
diminishing returns (e.g., Uzzi 1996). Also, strong ties may require more resources to maintain; 
thus actors may benefit from strong ties only when they need information to constantly flow to 
them (e.g., Boorman 1975). Careful consideration of our study vis-à-vis these studies therefore 
presents further opportunity for future research to explore bounds of the motivation associated 
with strong ties. Why are strong ties sometimes less helpful than weak ties, even though actors 
sharing strong ties are more motivated to help one another? Evidence from Chan (2009) and 
Desmond (2012) suggests that the motivation issue associated with social ties might determine 
the value of ties in often unexpected ways. These studies provide contexts where the higher 
motivation associated with strong ties is sometimes “turned off.” Our study helps guide the 
future research to explore why the motivation issue associated with social ties results in their 
unexpected value. Consequently, whereas Burt (1992, 35) proposed to “leap over the motivation 
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issue,” our study joins the stream of literature that brings the motivation issue back to research of 
social networks.  
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APPENDIX 
Other questions were asked with the vignette to get a sense of participants’ backgrounds. 
Responses to these questions were also used to check our randomization and test any mediation. 
For the randomization check, Appendix Table 1 reports two-way t-tests between two conditions 
that varied on tie strength, and Appendix Table 2 reports two-way t-tests between two conditions 
that varied on the amount of referral bonus. The tables show that participants in the four different 
conditions have the similar means of age and years of experience that are not significantly 
different. Other demographic variables such as participants’ gender, experience of having been 
referred, and experience of having referred someone are comparable across different conditions 
as well. 
Responses to the background questions reveal that, at least within our sample of first-year 
MBAs, referral activity is indeed a prevalent phenomenon in the labor market. This helps us 
build confidence that the labor market is the proper context to study the effect of tie strength on 
information transmission for our sample. 50.26% of the sample reported that they have applied to 
a job that they learned through social ties. Among them, 61.46% have taken the job. 59.67% of 
the entire sample reported that they have solicited someone to be their employee referral to a job 
opening at their company, and among them, 85.19% said that they have had people they referred 
apply for jobs at their company. Among experienced referrers, their referral bonus ranged from 
$0 to $10,000, with the mean at $2153.15 24.56% of those who said that they have been learned 
about a job through social ties reported that their referrers received a referral bonus, and 15.53% 
of those who said that they have referred someone reported that they received a referral bonus. It 
is worth noting that while these responses were collected after participants’ social ties to their 
                                                            
15 Only 17 respondents gave answers to this question. 
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hypothetical contacts were manipulated, they were likely unaffected by manipulations: there are 
no a priori reasons to believe that manipulations on tie strength altered their memories on past 
referral experience and demographic information. 
 
 
Appendix Table 1 – Two-way T-test for means between participants in the “Strong Tie” 
condition and participants in the “Weak Tie” condition 
 Mean in the 
“Friend” 
condition 
(standard 
deviation) 
Mean in the 
“Acquaintance” 
condition 
(standard 
deviation) 
T-statisticª Nᵇ 
Age 27.92 
(2.60) 
27.84 
(2.20) 0.22 193 
Years of 
Experience 
5.27 
(2.44) 
5.02 
(1.65) 0.81 196 
Gender 
(Female=1) 
0.35 
(0.48) 
0.32 
(0.47) 0.40 196 
Have you been 
referred to a job 
opportunity 
before? 
(Yes=1) 
0.54 
(0.50) 
0.57 
(0.50) -0.41 191 
Have you 
referred 
someone to a 
job opportunity 
before? 
(Yes=1) 
0.59 
(0.49) 
0.60 
(0.49) -0.15 181 
ªThe t-statistic is from the two-way t-test. Depending on the sample size, t-test may be limited in 
testing whether randomization worked (whether the means of the two conditions are the same) 
because comparing means of two small samples will inevitably lead to insignificance. We 
compare the raw means as well in order to make sure that randomization has been done 
successfully. 
ᵇNumber of cases differs across variables because of non-response. 
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Appendix Table 2 – Two-way T-test for means between participants in the “No bonus” 
condition and participants in the “$1000 referral bonus” condition 
 Mean in the “No 
referral bonus” 
condition 
(standard 
deviation) 
Mean in the 
“$1000 referral 
bonus” condition 
(standard 
deviation) 
T-statisticª Nᵇ 
Age 27.93 
(2.66) 
27.84 
(2.13) 0.26 193 
Years of 
Experience 
5.21 
(2.23) 
5.09 
(1.96) 0.40 196 
Gender 
(Female=1) 
0.31 
(0.46) 
0.37 
(0.48) -0.91 196 
Have you been 
referred to a job 
opportunity 
before? 
(Yes=1) 
0.58 
(0.50) 
0.52 
(0.50) 0.75 191 
Have you 
referred 
someone to a 
job opportunity 
before? 
(Yes=1) 
0.61 
(0.49) 
0.58 
(0.50) 0.40 181 
ªThe t-statistic is from the two-way t-test. Depending on the sample size, t-test may be limited in 
testing whether randomization worked (whether the means of the two conditions are the same) 
because comparing means of two small samples will inevitably lead to insignificance. We 
compare the raw means as well in order to make sure that randomization has been done 
successfully. 
ᵇNumber of cases differs across variables because of non-response. 
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Appendix Table 3 – Response to the second question where participants were asked how likely 
they were to refer their friends or acquaintances for the hypothetical job opportunity without 
their names attached. The possible value ranges from 1 to 9, from “Not very likely” to “Very 
likely,” respectively. The difference between these values and responses to the first question was 
used to calculate the second dependent variable. 
 
 
 Friend Acquaintance Differenceª 
 
 
No bonus 
 
3.71 
(2.45) 
[N=55] 
 
 
5.50 
(2.55) 
[N=46] 
 
*** 
 
 
$1,000 
 
3.40 
(2.40) 
[N=48] 
 
 
3.81 
(2.38) 
[N=47] 
 
NS 
Difference NS **  
 
 
ªP-value from the t-test on difference between the two values. The bottom row denotes p-value 
between “No bonus” and “$1000” conditions in each respective tie strength condition. The right-
most column denotes p-value from the t-test on difference between “Friend” and “Acquaintance” 
conditions in each respective bonus condition. **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; NS means p>0.05 
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Appendix Table 4 – Dependent variable is the respondent’s rating to the question “How likely 
are you to contact [friend or acquaintance] and encourage him to apply for the job as your 
referral,” ranging from 1 to 9, from “Not very likely” to “Very likely.” 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Tie strength (strong=1) 2.32*** 
(0.26) 
3.18*** 
(0.35) 
Bonus/100 0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.16*** 
(0.04) 
Tie strength × Bonus/100  -0.18*** 
(0.05) 
Intercept 5.38*** 
(0.23) 
4.91*** 
(0.26) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.30 0.33 
N 196 196 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 5  – Dependent variable is the respondent’s willingness to risk her reputation 
for her contact. The measure comes from subtracting the response to the second question (“How 
likely are you to contact [friend or acquaintance] and encourage him to apply for the job, but 
NOT using your name”) from the response to the first question (“How likely are you to contact 
[friend or acquaintance] and encourage him to apply for the job”). 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Tie strength (strong=1) 3.44*** 
(0.46) 
4.97*** 
(0.47) 
Bonus/100 0.16*** 
(0.05) 
0.32*** 
(0.63) 
Tie strength x Bonus/100  -0.31*** 
(0.0.09) 
Intercept 0.25 
(0.41) 
-0.59*** 
(0.47) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.24 0.28 
N 196 196 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
 
 
 
37 
 
Acknowledgements 
We are indebted to Ezra Zuckerman for his patient and generous advice on this paper. We also 
thank Brittany Bond, Jae-Kyung Ha, and Elena Obukhova, and participants in Economic 
Sociology Working Group at MIT Sloan and 8th Annual People and Organizations Conference at 
the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.  
References 
Aral, Sinan, and Marshall Van Alstyne. 2011. “The Diversity-Bandwidth Trade-Off.” American 
Journal of Sociology 117 (1): 90–171. 
Abraham, Mabel. 2015. “Explaining Unequal Returns to Social Capital among Entrepreneurs.” 
Unpublished Manuscript. 
Aldrich, Howard, Pat Ray Reese, and Paola Dubini. 1989. “Women on the Verge of a 
Breakthrough: Networking among Entrepreneurs in the United States and Italy.” 
Entrepreneurship & Regional Development 1 (4): 339-56 
Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. 
Barbulescu, Roxana. 2015. “The Strength of Many Kinds of Ties: Unpacking the Role of Social 
Contacts Across Stages of the Job Search Process.” Organization Science, April.  
Beaman, Lori, and Jeremy Magruder. 2012. “Who Gets the Job Referral? Evidence from a Social 
Networks Experiment.” American Economic Review 102 (7): 3574–93.  
Becker, Gary S. 1976. “Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology.” 
Journal of Economic Literature 14 (3): 817–26. 
Bewley, Truman F. 1999. Why Wages Don’t Fall During a Recession. Harvard University Press. 
Bian, Yanjie. 1994. Work and Inequality in Urban China. SUNY Press. 
———. 1997. “Bringing Strong Ties Back in: Indirect Ties, Network Bridges, and Job Searches 
in China.” American Sociological Review 62 (3): 366–85.  
Bian, Yanjie, Xianbi Huang, and Lei Zhang. 2015. “Information and Favoritism: The Network 
Effect on Wage Income in China.” Social Networks 40 (January): 129–38.  
Bidwell, Matthew, and Fernandez-Mateo, Isabel. 2008. "Three is a Crowd? Understanding 
Triadic Employment Relationships." In Cappelli, P. (Ed). Employment Relationships: 
New Models of White Collar Work. Cambridge University Press. 
Boorman, Scott A. 1975. “A Combinatorial Optimization Model for Transmission of Job 
Information through Contact Networks.” The Bell Journal of Economics 6 (1): 216–49.  
38 
 
Burt, Ronald. 1992. Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press. 
Centola, Damon, and Michael Macy. 2007. “Complex Contagions and the Weakness of Long 
Ties.” American Journal of Sociology 113 (3): 702–34.  
Centola, Damon. 2010. “The Spread of Behavior in an Online Social Network Experiment.” 
Science 329 (5996): 1194–97. 
Chan, Cheris Shun-ching. 2009. “Invigorating the Content in Social Embeddedness: An 
Ethnography of Life Insurance Transactions in China.” American Journal of Sociology 
115 (3): 712–54.  
Cingano, Federico, and Alfonso Rosolia. 2012. “People I Know: Job Search and Social 
Networks.” Journal of Labor Economics 30 (2): 291–332.  
Cowan, Sarah K., 2014. Secrets and Misperceptions: The Creation of Self-Fulfilling Illusions. 
Sociological Science 1:466–492. 
Cromie, Stan, and Sue Birley. 1992. “Networking by Female Business Owners in Northern 
Ireland.” Journal of Business Venturing 7 (3): 237–51.  
Desmond, Matthew. 2012. “Disposable Ties and the Urban Poor.” American Journal of 
Sociology 117 (5): 1295–1335. 
Fay, Michael P., and Michael A. Proschan. 2010. “Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney or T-Test? On 
Assumptions for Hypothesis Tests and Multiple Interpretations of Decision Rules.” 
Statistics Surveys 4: 1–39.  
Fernandez, Roberto M., and Brittany Bond. 2015. “Networks for the Unemployed?” Working 
Paper. 
Fernandez, Roberto M., and Emilio J. Castilla. 2001. “How Much is That Network Worth? 
Social Capital in Employee Referral Networks.” in Social Capital: Theory and Research 
(eds.) Nan Lin, Karen Cook, and Ronald S. Burt. New York: Aldine De Gruyter. 
Fernandez, Roberto M., and Isabel Fernandez-Mateo. 2006. “Networks, Race, and Hiring.” 
American Sociological Review 71 (1): 42–71.  
Fernandez, Roberto M., and M. Lourdes Sosa. 2005. “Gendering the Job: Networks and 
Recruitment at a Call Center.” American Journal of Sociology 111 (3): 859–904.  
Fernandez, Roberto M., and Nancy Weinberg. 1997. “Sifting and Sorting: Personal Contacts and 
Hiring in a Retail Bank.” American Sociological Review 62 (6): 883–902.  
39 
 
Fernandez, Roberto M., and Roger V. Gould. 1994. “A Dilemma of State Power: Brokerage and 
Influence in the National Health Policy Domain.” American Journal of Sociology 99 (6): 
1455–91. 
Fernandez, Roberto M., and Roman V. Galperin. 2014. “The Causal Status of Social Capital in 
Labor Markets.” In Contemporary Perspectives on Organizational Social Networks, 
Research in the Sociology of Organizations 40:445–62. Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited.  
Fernandez, Roberto M., Emilio J. Castilla, and Paul Moore. 2000. “Social Capital at Work: 
Networks and Employment at a Phone Center.” American Journal of Sociology 105 (5): 
1288–1356. 
Fernandez-Mateo, Isabel. 2007. “Who Pays the Price of Brokerage? Transferring Constraint 
through Price Setting in the Staffing Sector.” American Sociological Review 72 (2): 291–
317.  
Fernandez-Mateo, Isabel, and Zella King. 2011. “Anticipatory Sorting and Gender Segregation 
in Temporary Employment.” Management Science 57 (6): 989–1008.  
Fleming, Lee, Charles King, and Adam I. Juda. 2007. “Small Worlds and Regional Innovation.” 
Organization Science 18 (6): 938–54.  
Friedman, Raymond A., and Joel Podolny. 1992. “Differentiation of Boundary Spanning Roles: 
Labor Negotiations and Implications for Role Conflict.” Administrative Science 
Quarterly 37 (1): 28–47.  
Gërxhani, Klarita, Jordi Brandts, and Arthur Schram. 2013. “The Emergence of Employer 
Information Networks in an Experimental Labor Market.” Social Networks 35 (4): 541–
60.  
Godechot, Olivier. 2016. “The Chance of Influence: A Natural Experiment on the Role of Social 
Capital in Faculty Recruitment.” Social Networks 46: 60-75 
Gould, Roger V., and Roberto M. Fernandez. 1989. “Structures of Mediation: A Formal 
Approach to Brokerage in Transaction Networks.” Sociological Methodology 19.  
Granovetter, Mark S. 1973. “The Strength of Weak Ties.” American Journal of Sociology 78 (6): 
1360–80. 
———. 1979. "Placement as Brokerage: Information Problems in the Labor Market for 
Rehabilitated Workers.” Pp. 83-101 in Placement in Rehabilitation: A Career 
Development Perspective, edited by David Vandergoot and John D. Worrall. Baltimore, 
Maryland: University Park Press. 
40 
 
———. 1983. “The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited.” Sociological Theory 
1: 201–33. 
———. 1995. Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Careers. University of Chicago Press. 
Greenberg, Jason, and Roberto M. Fernandez. 2016. The Strength of Weak Ties in MBA Job 
Search: A Within-Person Test. Sociological Science 3: 296–316.  
Hahl, Oliver, Ezra W. Zuckerman, and Minjae Kim. 2015. “Why Authenticity is In Demand: 
Overcoming High-Status Denigration with Outsider Art.” Unpublished Manuscript. 
Hansen, Morten T. 1999. “The Search-Transfer Problem: The Role of Weak Ties in Sharing 
Knowledge across Organization Subunits.” Administrative Science Quarterly 44 (1): 82–
111.  
Horváth, Gergely. 2014. “Occupational Mismatch and Social Networks.” Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 106 (October): 442–68.  
Lin, Nan, Walter M. Ensel, and John C. Vaughn. 1981. “Social Resources and Strength of Ties: 
Structural Factors in Occupational Status Attainment.” American Sociological Review 46 
(4): 393–405.  
Liu, William T., and Robert W. Duff. 1972. “The Strength in Weak Ties.” Public Opinion 
Quarterly 36 (3): 361–66.  
Mann, H. B., and D. R. Whitney. 1947. “On a Test of Whether One of Two Random Variables Is 
Stochastically Larger than the Other.” The Annals of Mathematical Statistics 18 (1): 50–
60. 
Marin, Alexandra. 2012. “Don’t Mention It: Why People Don’t Share Job Information, When 
They Do, and Why It Matters.” Social Networks 34 (2): 181–92.  
Marsden, Peter V., and Elizabeth H. Gorman. 2001. “Social Networks, Job Changes, and 
Recruitment.” In Sourcebook of Labor Markets, edited by Ivar Berg and Arne L. 
Kalleberg, 467–502. Plenum Studies in Work and Industry. Springer US.  
Marsden, Peter V., and Karen E. Campbell. 1984. “Measuring Tie Strength.” Social Forces 63 
(2): 482–501.  
———. 2012. “Reflections on Conceptualizing and Measuring Tie Strength.” Social Forces 91 
(1): 17–23.  
McDonald, Steve, and Glen H. Elder. 2006. “When Does Social Capital Matter? Non-Searching 
For Jobs Across the Life Course.” Social Forces 85 (1): 521–49.  
41 
 
McDonald, Steve. 2011. “What You Know or Who You Know? Occupation-Specific Work 
Experience and Job Matching through Social Networks.” Social Science Research 40 (6): 
1664–75.  
McGuire, Gail M., and William T. Bielby. 2015. “The Variable Effects of Tie Strength and 
Social Resources How Type of Support Matters.” Work and Occupations, August, 18. 
McPherson, Miller, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M. Cook. 2001. “Birds of a Feather: 
Homophily in Social Networks.” Annual Review of Sociology 27 (January): 415–44. 
Montgomery, James D. 1992. “Job Search and Network Composition: Implications of the 
Strength-Of-Weak-Ties Hypothesis.” American Sociological Review 57 (5): 586–96.  
Mouw, Ted. 2003. “Social Capital and Finding a Job: Do Contacts Matter?” American 
Sociological Review 68 (6): 868–98.  
Murray, Stephen O., Joseph H. Rankin, and Dennis W. Magill. 1981. “Strong Ties and Job 
Information.” Work and Occupations 8 (1): 119–36.  
Obukhova, Elena, and George Lan. 2013. “Do Job Seekers Benefit from Contacts? A Direct Test 
with Contemporaneous Searches.” Management Science 59 (10): 2204–16.  
Obukhova, Elena. 2012. “Motivation vs. Relevance: Using Strong Ties to Find a Job in Urban 
China.” Social Science Research 41 (3): 570–80.  
Podolny, Joel M., and James N. Baron. 1997. “Resources and Relationships: Social Networks 
and Mobility in the Workplace.” American Sociological Review 62 (5): 673–93.  
Rainwater, Lee. 1970. Behind Ghetto Walls: Black Family Life in a Federal Slum. First Edition. 
Chicago: Aldine Transaction. 
Reagans, Ray, and Bill McEvily. 2003. “Network Structure and Knowledge Transfer: The 
Effects of Cohesion and Range.” Administrative Science Quarterly 48 (2): 240–67.  
Reagans, Ray, and Ezra W. Zuckerman. 2008. “A Shortcut to Efficiency? Implications of the 
Small but Stratified World.” Unpublished Manuscript. 
Reagans, Ray. 2005. “Preferences, Identity, and Competition: Predicting Tie Strength from 
Demographic Data.” Management Science 51 (9): 1374–83.  
Rogers, Everett M., and Dilip K. Bhowmik. 1970. “Homophily-Heterophily: Relational Concepts 
for Communication Research.” Public Opinion Quarterly 34 (4): 523–38.  
Rubineau, Brian, and Roberto M. Fernandez. 2013. “Missing Links: Referrer Behavior and Job 
Segregation.” Management Science 59 (11): 2470–89.  
42 
 
———. 2015. “How do Labor Market Networks Work?,” in Emerging Trends in the Social and 
Behavior Sciences (eds.) Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley 
and Sons. 
Ruef, Martin, Howard E. Aldrich, and Nancy M. Carter. 2003. “The Structure of Founding 
Teams: Homophily, Strong Ties, and Isolation among U.S. Entrepreneurs.” American 
Sociological Review 68 (2): 195–222.  
Salganik, Matthew J., Peter Sheridan Dodds, and Duncan J. Watts. 2006. “Experimental Study of 
Inequality and Unpredictability in an Artificial Cultural Market.” Science 311 (5762): 
854–56.  
Saloner, Garth. 1985. “Old Boy Networks as Screening Mechanisms.” Journal of Labor 
Economics 3 (3): 255–67. 
Simmel, Georg. 1950. “The Stranger,” Pp. 402-408 in The Sociology of Georg Simmel. 
Translated, edited, and with an introduction by Kurt H. Wolff. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free 
Press. 
Simpson, Brent, and Robb Willer. 2015. “Beyond Altruism: Sociological Foundations of 
Cooperation and Prosocial Behavior.” Annual Review of Sociology 41 (1): 43–63.  
Smith, Sandra Susan. 2005. “‘Don’t Put My Name on It’: Social Capital Activation and Job‐
Finding Assistance among the Black Urban Poor.” American Journal of Sociology 111 
(1): 1–57.  
———. 2007. Lone Pursuit: Distrust and Defensive Individualism Among the Black Poor. New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Trimble O’Connor, Lindsey. 2013. “Ask and You Shall Receive: Social Network Contacts’ 
Provision of Help during the Job Search.” Social Networks 35 (4): 593–603.  
Uzzi, Brian, and Jarrett Spiro. 2005. “Collaboration and Creativity: The Small World Problem.” 
American Journal of Sociology 111 (2): 447–504.  
Uzzi, Brian. 1996. “The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic 
Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect.” American Sociological Review 61 
(4): 674–698. 
Uzzi, Brian. 1997. “Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of 
Embeddedness.” Administrative Science Quarterly 42 (1): 35–67.  
Watts, Duncan J. 1999. “Networks, Dynamics, and the Small‐World Phenomenon.” American 
Journal of Sociology 105 (2): 493–527.  
43 
 
Watts, Duncan J., and Steven H. Strogatz. 1998. “Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-World’ 
Networks.” Nature 393 (6684): 440–42.  
Watts, Duncan J., Peter Sheridan Dodds, and M. E. J. Newman. 2002. “Identity and Search in 
Social Networks.” Science 296 (5571): 1302–5.  
Wegener, Bernd. 1991. “Job Mobility and Social Ties: Social Resources, Prior Job, and Status 
Attainment.” American Sociological Review 56 (1): 60–71.  
Wilson, William Julius. 1996. When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor. 
Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. 
Xiao, Zhixing, and Anne S. Tsui. 2007. “When Brokers May Not Work: The Cultural 
Contingency of Social Capital in Chinese High-Tech Firms.” Administrative Science 
Quarterly 52 (1): 1–31.  
Yakubovich, Valery. 2005. “Weak Ties, Information, and Influence: How Workers Find Jobs in 
a Local Russian Labor Market.” American Sociological Review 70 (3): 408–21.  
Yamagishi, Toshio, and Nobuhiro Mifune. 2008. “Does Shared Group Membership Promote 
Altruism? Fear, Greed, and Reputation.” Rationality and Society 20 (1): 5–30. 
